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A Law Guardian by the Same Name:
A Response to Professor Guggenheim's
Matrimonial Commission Critique
MerrH Sobie*
Introduction
A symposium "response" customarily presents a contra-
sting position to the primary article. However, perhaps to the
chagrin of the sponsors, the reader and, alas, to me, I agree with
Professor Guggenheim. I too, experienced disappointment upon
reviewing the Matrimonial Commission Report's law guardian
section, and concur with his conclusion that the Commission
"missed an important opportunity."1 Of course we disagree on
plenty-the role of the law guardian, for example-but our dis-
agreements are largely dehors the Report. Unfortunately, the
Commission has failed to address the critical issues (if they had,
their report would have precipitated the intended responsive
format). I nevertheless believe that several Commission recom-
mendations merit support, and that their recommendations
should be viewed as a minor step on the long journey towards
the effective representation of children. As far as the more sub-
stantive issues, well, that is what Professor Guggenheim's arti-
cle and this author's response are all about.
I commence this article with a discussion of the statutory
provisions governing the appointment and responsibilities of at-
torneys who represent children in New York. Part II briefly
outlines the chronological implementation from initial enact-
ment through the Matrimonial Commission Report, a period
spanning forty-five years. Parts III and IV explore the specific
nature of child custody representation and the relationship be-
tween the attorney and the child client during the course of a
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. Prof. Sobie was formerly
the Executive Officer of the New York City Family Court.
1. Martin Guggenheim, A Law Guardian by Any Other Name: A Critique of
the Report of the Matrimonial Commission, 27 PACE L. REV. 785 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter Guggenheim, Critiquel.
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frequently lengthy proceeding. Last, the Commission's conclu-
sions and recommendations are critiqued in Parts V and VI.
1. The Source
Let's jump even further back from Professor Guggenheim's
opening statement summarizing Judge Breitel's 1978 Braiman
v. Braiman opinion,2 to the birth of children's representation.
Enacting the 1962 Family Court Act, the New York Legislature
established, for the first time anywhere in the United States,
the right of a child to be represented by counsel. The 1962 pro-
visions remain effective today. After forty-five years it may
prove helpful to quote the operative sheet music, viewing the
critical provisions as though they were enacted yesterday,
unencumbered by the intervening decades of ideology, politics,
and case law development.
This act declares that minors who are the subject of family
court proceedings ... should be represented by counsel of their
own choosing or by law guardians . . . . This declaration is based
on a finding that counsel is often indispensable ....3
As used in this act, 'law guardian' refers to an attorney ad-
mitted to practice law in the state of New York ... ,4
The costs oflaw guardians. , . shall be payable by the state of
New York within the amounts appropriated therefore.5
Supervision by administrative board. The administrative
board of the judicial conference [now the Office of Court Adminis-
tration] may prescribe standards for the exercise of the powers
granted to the appellate divisions under this part and may re-
quire such reports as it deems desirable.6
This part establishes a system of law guardians for minors
who often require the assistance of counsel to protect their inter-
ests and to help them express their wishes to the court.7
Reading the pristine statutory language, I believe the fol-
lowing conclusions are unassailable:
2. Braiman v. Braiman, 378 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 1978).
3. NY FAM. CT. ACT § 241 (McKinney 1962).
4. [d. § 242.
5. [d. § 248.
6. [d. § 246.
7. [d. § 241.
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1. Children have the right to choose counsel (just as their
elders may). In fact, a law guardian appointment is the statu-
tory default option-a child may choose counselor, if not, she
has the right to be represented by a law guardian.
2. A law guardian is an "attorney" or is "counsel" to the
child (the two words are used interchangeably throughout the
applicable sections of law)-nothing more and nothing less.
The Matrimonial Commission's recommendation that the title
be changed from "law guardian" to "attorney for the child" rep-
resents no substantive modification at all. 8
3. A law guardian (or attorney for the child) is paid by the
state of New York "within the amounts appropriated therefore,"
and from nowhere else. An attorney who is not assigned in ac-
cord with the Act, to be paid via the authorized state fiscal
mechanism, cannot be a law guardian. Thus, the so-called "pri-
vate pay" law guardian represents a misapplication of the rele-
vant statutes; the title itself is an oxymoronic phrase (more
about the "private pay" law guardian later).
4. Responsibility for the law guardian system is statutorily
entrusted to the Office of Court Administration ("DCA") (the
statute, dating from 1962 refers to DCA's predecessor organiza-
tion).9 DCA is statutorily empowered to enter into agreements
with legal aid societies to provide law guardians in a county,10
and several statutory agreements have been implemented over
the past several decades. Empowered with the plenary author-
ity to contract for representation, DCA effectively determines
the form of children's representation throughout the state. Al-
though in the absence of an DCA agreement the Appellate Divi-
sions are delegated significant powers relating to the delivery of
law guardian services within a specific countY,ll even that au-
thority is subject to such "standards for the exercise of the pow-
ers" as OCA's Administrative Board may prescribe (as well as
the possibility that OCA will override the Appellate Divisions
8. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK (2006), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reports/matrimonial
commissionreport.pdf [hereinafter MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT], reprinted
here as Appendix A. That said, the recommendation would publicly clarify the
attorney's role and, for that reason, merits implementation.
9. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 243 (McKinney 1962).
10. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 243(a) (McKinney 1999).
11. See id. § 243.
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by contracting directly with legal service providers). To further
bolster OCA's oversight, the Act subjects Appellate Division
contracts for law guardian services to regulations promulgated
by the Administrative Board,12 and specifically requires that
the Administrative Board approve the designation of Appellate
Division law guardian panels for each county.l3 In short, the
Act envisions a unified, integrated, statewide system for afford-
ing children representation with specific authority delegated to
the Appellate Divisions, subject to statewide standards, approv-
als, and oversight. The structural system, as mandated, has
never been realized.
5. A law guardian is statutorily obligated to act as "counsel
to protect their [the children's] interests"14 and to "help them
express their wishes to the court."15 That prescription is not
unique to children's law. Attorneys, whether retained or as-
signed, do likewise when defending clients, in actions ranging
from contracts to criminal law. The first prong, protecting the
child's interests, represents a straight codification of Canon EC
6-4 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility, stipulating that,
"[h]aving undertaken representation, a lawyer should use
proper care to safeguard the interests of his client."16 The sec-
ond prong, representing the child's wishes, is similarly main-
stream to the attorney-client relationship. Lawyers must
respect their client's wishes, regardless of age.
6. Crucially, the applicable statutes do not stipulate, imply
or even hint that the child's attorney should advocate the child's
"best interests" (a far different concept than protecting a client's
legal interests). Although Section 241 has been mis-cited count-
less times for the proposition that the law guardian must re-
present the child's "best interests,"17 in reality the ''best
interests" rule has no statutory basis at all. The unintended
development of "best interests" lawyering will be discussed
12. [d. § 243(b).
13. [d. § 243(c).
14. [d. § 241.
15. [d.
16. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 6-4 (1983). Safeguarding in-
terests is synonymous with protecting interests.
17. See, e.g., Albanese v. Lee, 707 N.Y.S.2d 171 (App. Div. 2000); Carballeira
v. Shumway, 710 N.Y.S.2d 149 (App. Div. 2000).
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later.I8 Suffice to say, at this point, that the Act itself requires
an uncompromised attorney-client relationship between the law
guardian/counsel and the child client.
Enactment of the law guardian statutes constituted a radi~
cal child's rights manifesto in 1962, five years prior to the
landmark Gault case,19 and prior to the appearance of counsel
(except on rare occasion) for any child in any court. The revolu~
tionary legislative decision to afford state paid representation to
children is underscored by the observation in the 1967 United
States Supreme Court's Gault decision that approximately two~
thirds of the states did not even permit retained counsel (much
less assigned counsel) to represent children who faced possible
incarceration.20 Forty-five years later, the operative statutes
have not surrendered their radical luster-perhaps for no rea~
son other than the failure to fully implement almost every man~
dated provision.
II. Implementation
At least in New York City, the initial implementation of the
law guardian system tracked the applicable statutes closely.
Law guardian services were provided by the then newly estab-
lished Juvenile Rights Division of the Legal Aid Society (JRD),
as organized and directed by Charles Schinitsky, a legendary
figure who had led the fight for children's representation. Pro-
fessor Guggenheim, who joined JRD in its first decade, has
written eloquently of the founding philosophy. Noting that JRD
rejected the "guardian ad litem" model, he has characterized
the then prevailing JRD law guardian role as follows: "[W]e
were defense lawyers fighting what we conceived to be the
state's efforts to interfere with the freedom of our clients to live
the life they chose."21 Those were heady days, with JRD bat-
18. See infra Part IV A.
19. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. Id. at 37-38 (stating that, "[i]n at least one-third of the States, statutes
now provide for the right of representation by retained counsel in juvenile delin-
quency proceedings, notice of the right [to representation], or assignment of coun-
sel, or a combination of these").
21. Martin Guggenheim, How Children's Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6
NEV. L.J. 805, 808 (2006) [hereinafter Guggenheim, State Interest].
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tling for children's rights in Family Court, on appeal, and
through class action litigation.
To be sure, the trial bench, unaccustomed to counsel and,
as a group, fervently in favor of a "best interests" or "guardian
ad litem" approach, was not amused. I recall vividly several
stormy administrative meetings in the late 1960's with the
Family Court bench on one side and Charles Schinitsky on the
opposite side, literally and figuratively.22 The traditional attor-
ney-client model, as envisioned by the Act, nevertheless largely
prevailed, protected by JRD's fierce independence, the relative
insulation of statewide funding (as opposed to local funding),
and the support of senior judicial administrative officials.
But New York City constitutes only one part of a vast state.
Outside the city, the introduction of attorneys for children
changed little. Except for a few large counties, the "panel" sys-
tem,23 an arrangement which permits local judges to appoint
law guardians from an "approved" list (not necessarily in rota-
tion) was and still is employed. Consequently, the local judge
assigns whomever he wishes, effectively controlling the role of
the child's counseJ.24 Going one step further, in the early days
judges frequently dispensed with lawyers altogether by encour-
aging or dictating waiver of counsel. Widespread anecdotal evi-
dence of judicially imposed waivers on children ("you don't
think you need a lawyer, do you?") led to the 1978 enactment of
Section 249(a) of the Family Court Act, effectively precluding
waiver, at least in juvenile delinquency cases, where counsel is
constitutionally required (and in person in need of supervision
proceedings). Contributing to local judicial control was the lack
of supervision, oversight, or regulation. At the state level, the
Judicial Conference (the predecessor of OCA) was absolutely si-
lent, and at the regional level, the Appellate Divisions were
equally quiet. Both august agencies failed to act, in derogation
of their statutory responsibilities.
22. In 1967, I was appointed to the position of Assistant to the Director of
Administration of the Courts ofthe First Department. In that capacity, I attended
multiple meetings convened to discuss the judges' objections and concerns.
23. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 243(c) (McKinney 1999).
24. Individual judicial assignments are precluded in New York City, where
JRD controls the recruitment and assignment of law guardians. For a discussion
of the perils of judicial control, see infra Part V.
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By the commencement of the second "law guardian genera-
tion" even JRD had modified its initial strong attorney-client
model. Professor Guggenheim attributes the shift largely to the
proliferation of child welfare cases (as opposed to delinquency
cases).25 Yes, the traditional attorney-client relationship is
more difficult to maintain in child welfare cases, where the cli-
ent is very young,26 but the caseload migration to child welfare
was only one factor in the progression from client advocacy to a
"best interests" approach. Other factors were the failure to im-
plement the system, as prescribed by statute, throughout most
of the state, (New York City is not as isolated as it occasionally
believes) the changing leadership at JRD, and most notably, the
growing paramountcy of "best interests" appellate case law.27
In 1982, exactly twenty years after the establishment of the
system, the New York State Bar Association, reacting to wide-
spread criticism concerning the abilities and the efficacy of law
guardians, sponsored a comprehensive study. Not surprisingly,
the study found extraordinary inadequacies. Outside New York
City, the majority of assigned law guardians never even met
their clients, discovery was non-existent, the number of appeals
initiated by law guardians was virtually nil, and only twenty-
one percent of law guardians provided even "acceptable repre-
sentation."28 The perceived role of the law guardian was found
to be almost irrelevant; representation by a "phantom" attor-
ney, one who never meets his client, is meaningless, regardless
of how counsel's role is defined.
Several of the recommendations in the 1984 Report were
implemented, including a recommendation that the Bar Associ-
ation promulgate standards for the representation of children.
In fact, it is those standards which the Matrimonial Commis-
sion endorses,29 and Professor Guggenheim criticizes. Other
recommendations were never implemented, notably restructur-
ing of the law guardian system through the establishment of a
25. Guggenheim, State Interests, supra note 21, at 809-14.
26. Almost all juvenile delinquency clients are above the age of thirteen,
whereas the majority of child welfare clients are below the age of eleven.
27. See infra Part IV A.
28. See generally JANE KNITZER & MERRIL SOBlE, LAw GUARDIANS IN NEW
YORK STATE: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN, NEW YORK
STATE BAR AsSOCIATION (1984).
29. See MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 42.
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statewide law guardian office. One positive consequence of the
Report was that the Appellate Divisions began to take their re-
sponsibilities seriously. Law guardian offices were established
in each department and, in due course, those regional offices
introduced training programs, screening mechanisms, and aux-
iliary services. On the other hand, the overarching responsibili-
ties of OCA remain unfulfilled to this day. OCA has simply
failed to implement their part of the 1962 bargain.
Systemically, the system is better than in 1982, thanks in
large part to the law guardian directors' offices. Most children
receive at least minimally adequate representation, as mea-
sured by communications between counsel and client and the
prevalence of attorney advocacy (however formulated). In New
York City, JRD has recently moved toward a more aggressive
client advocacy model. The function of the law guardian re-
mains murky and the structure of contractual assignments, as
well as the panel system, need reformation.30 But children are
generally better served than heretofore, although the level of
representation remains well below ideal.
III. The Law Guardian and Child Custody Proceedings
The original Act, circa 1962, limited law guardian appoint-
ments to juvenile delinquency, child neglect, and person in need
of supervision cases.3! An early amendment, however, author-
ized law guardian representation "in any other proceeding in
which the [Family] court has jurisdiction ...."32 The revision
enabled a Family Court judge to assign a law guardian to re-
present the child in a custody proceeding (the Supreme Court,
which maintains concurrent custody jurisdiction, was excluded
from the law guardian system until 1990). Initially, the discre-
tionary assignment of counsel in a custody dispute was used
only sparingly, usually when child protective issues arose or the
dispute was even more contentious than the normally emotional
intra-parent litigation.
30. See infra Part VI.
31. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 249 (McKinney 1962). This was true even in those
cases in which appointment was mandated only at the request of the child, a par-
ent, or the court sua sponte, as though a young child could or would request
counsel.
32. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 6 (McKinney 1970).
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This brings my story, at last, to Professor Guggenheim's
opening statement33 and Braiman v. Braiman.34 In Braiman,
the New York Supreme Court, after hearing contradictory and
highly inflammatory testimony, rendered a glib Solomonic deci-
sion: the embattled parents would share custody.35 The Court
of Appeals reversed, establishing the rule that joint or shared
custody could not be ordered by a court over the objections of
embattled confrontational parents.36 Grasping for a way to cut
through the hopelessly conflicting testimony, Judge Breitel sug-
gested that, on remand, the trial court consider the appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem to investigate the truth and
perhaps guide the court with a dispassionate presentation and
recommendation.37 The Court of Appeals did not and could not,
propose the appointment of a law guardian, or any other attor-
ney for the children. Braiman was a Supreme Court case and,
in 1979, the Supreme Court lacked any such power. Further,
Judge Breitel knew full well the distinction between a law
guardian and a guardian ad litem; he was simply reaching for
the only possibly authorized figure who might help the
children.38
Judge Breitel's suggestion never caught on, and in a cus-
tody case the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the child
remains a rare event. Nor did the decision spawn the age of
child representation. Appointing an attorney for the child en-
meshed in a custody dispute evolved instead from the growing
realization that a child needs legal representation.39 In the past
33. Guggenheim, Critique, supra note 1, at 785.
34. See Braiman v. Braiman, 402 N.Y.S.2d 643 (App. Div. 1977), rev'd 378
N.E.2d 1019 (1978).
35. [d. at 649.
36. [d. at 648.
37. [d. at 649.
38. The suggestion specifically meant a guardian ad litem appointment pur-
suant to section 1202 of the N.Y. C.P.L.R. (McKinney 1978). Guardian ad litem
appointments are authorized in any case, ranging from personal injury to child
custody, when a person of any age lacks the capacity to retain and direct counsel.
A guardian ad item does not enter into an attorney-client relationship, cannot file
motions, examine or cross-examine witnesses, or otherwise act as an attorney (de-
spite the confusion precipitated when an attorney for the child is paradoxically
asked to perform a "guardian ad litem" role). By definition, the positions of guard-
ian ad litem and law guardian conflict.
39. See, e.g., Linda D. Elrod, Counsel for the Children in Custody Disputes:
The Time is Now, 26 FAM. L.Q. 53 (1992).
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twenty-five years a national consensus has emerged. Ergo,
many states have enacted legislation permitting the court to as-
sign counsel to represent the child.40 Continuing the national
trend, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act stipulates that,
"[t]he court may appoint an attorney to represent the interests
of a minor or dependent child with respect to his support, cus-
tody, and visitation."41 As noted, New York, which pioneered in
providing legal representation to children, extended the law
guardian provisions to Family Court custody cases in 1970. In
1990, the Legislature further extended the provision to the Su-
preme Court,42 assuring the availability of counsel regardless of
the forum. Even more recently, New York appellate case law
has practically turned the discretionary appointive power into a
mandatory rule, at least when custody is contested, by finding
the absence of a law guardian to be "an abuse of discretion."43
Professor Guggenheim's assessment is correct, although the
Braiman connection is questionable. From meager sources,
representation in custody cases has mushroomed to the
commonplace.
Of course, the "Johnny corne lately" proceeding, child cus-
tody, inherited the problems described earlier in this article.
The deed had already occurred. Representation had turned
from client advocacy to an uneasy amalgam of client wishes and
"best interests" advocacy, from Brooklyn to Buffalo.
IV. The Law Guardian and the Child Client
A. Confusion in the Courtroom
As noted, the law guardian's legislated function is that of
attorney for the child. The intended relationship is that of at-
torney-client, with the attorney protecting the client's interests
and adhering to the client's wishes. Unfortunately, the case law
has pulled in a different direction by asserting that the law
40. California, for example, statutorily provided for counsel commencing in
1994. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3150 (West 2004). Wisconsin is the only state which
statutorily mandates the assignment of counsel to represent a child in a contested
custody case. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.045(1) (West 2006).
41. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 310, 9A pt. 2 U.L.A. 13 (1973).
42. N.Y. JUD. LAw § 35(7) (McKinney 1990).
43. See, e.g., Albanese v. Lee, 707 N.Y.S.2d 171 (App. Div. 2000); Davis v. Da-
vis, 711 N.Y.S.2d 663 (App. Div. 2000).
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guardian should argue the child's "best interests" as perceived
. by counsel. Given the statutory framework, the courts have
been constrained to at least acknowledge the Code provisions,
which grant the child the right to choose counsel and to have
counsel "help" articulate his wishes to the court. The upshot
has been rank confusion.
Take the leading case of Carballeira v. ShumwaY,44 dis-
cussed by Professor Guggenheim in his article.45 In Carballeira
the court prescribed the law guardian role in a custody case as
follows:
[T]he law guardian has the statutorily directed responsibility to
represent the child's wishes as well as to advocate the child's best
interest. Because the result desired by the child and the result
that is in the child's best interest may diverge, Law Guardians
sometimes face a conflict in such advocacy.46
Carballeira's paramount problem is that the law guardian's
"conflict" or dichotomy is a pure judicial invention. As noted
earlier, the operative statute, Section 241 of the Family Court
Act, does not stipulate, mention or imply a "best interests" ap-
proach. Nor, I might add, does one need legal counsel just to
parrot one's wishes (although that aspect, unlike "best inter-
ests," maintains a statutory basis). Rather, an individual, re-
gardless of age, needs legal counsel to express and implement
wishes in the context of a legal proceeding. The landlord who
wishes to toss out a tenant does not retain an attorney to tell
the court that simple fact; he engages counsel to draft, file, ar-
gue and otherwise pursue an eviction proceeding. That is how a
lawyer deals with a client's "wishes;" he uses the tools of his
profession to achieve the client's goals. And that is just how a
child's lawyer should deal with the child's wishes. Having er-
ected the Potemkin "best interests" village, the Shumway court
concluded that the attorney was correct in advocating the "best
interests" of his mature eleven-year-old child client, despite her
contrary wishes.47 So much for following explicit statutory
language.
44. Carballeira v. Shumway, 710 N.Y.S.2d 149 CAppo Div. 2000).
45. See Guggenheim, Critique, supra note 1, at 810-12.
46. [d. at 152. Carballeira has been cited widely. See, e.g., James MM v. June
00, 740 N.Y.S.2d 730, 732-33 CAppo Div. 2002).
47. Shumway, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 152-53.
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Shumway is not alone.48 Given that the appellate courts
devised conflicting "statutory" mandates, judges have unsur-
prisingly decided whichever way suited the case, or worse, have
imposed the judge's personal view. Contrast, for example, Alba-
nese v. Lee,49 where the court upheld the right of the child to
choose counsel who would adequately express her wishes to the
court (the assigned law guardian assumed a "neutral" posi-
tion),50 with James MM v. June 00, where the court concluded
that the law guardian should advocate "best interests."51 Mter
reading the case law a newly minted law guardian could not
possibly know the path to follow. Professor Guggenheim is es-
sentially correct in concluding that, "[clase law imposes almost
no limitations on the discretion accorded to the child's lawyers,
beyond that they may not silence the child."52
But there also exist major constraints beyond the case law
muddle. Of these, the greatest limitation, by far, is the specific
desires of the appointing trial judge (except in those counties
which do not employ panels). Judicial wishes, but not children's
wishes, often prevail. Attorneys do not readily go against the
appointive hand that feeds them, and will almost never directly
challenge the trial court unless fully protected by case law. The
conflicting case law thereby strengthens judicial authority at
the expense of the child's right to meaningful representation.53
Confusion is further exacerbated by the fact that the term
"best interests" mirrors the applicable substantive law rule. In
determining a custody case the court rules in favor of the plain-
tiff or the defendant by applying a "best interests of the child"
standard.54 Of course, the law guardian consequently argues
that her position furthers the child's best interests. Of course,
so does every other attorney, including counsel for the respec-
tive parents. That's the job of counsel-to convince the court
48. See Guggenheim, Critique, supra note 1, at 810.
49. Albanese, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 172; see also In re Derick Shea D., 804 N.Y.S.2d
389, 390 (App. Div. 2005) (holding that the lawyer should have advocated the
child's wishes).
50. Albanese, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
51. James MM, 740 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
52. Guggenheim, Critique, supra note 1, at 813.
53. Other potential limitations on the child's lawyer's discretion include: the
code of professional responsibility, bar promulgated standards, and the attorney's
training and background.
54. See Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 432 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1982).
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that his client's position is consistent with the substantive stan-
dard, and to simultaneously convince the court that the adver-
sary's position is inimical to the substantive standard. Ergo,
when the same matrimonial case progresses from child custody
to the equitable division of marital property, each parent's at-
torney will eloquently argue that the standard is satisfied by
awarding his client the lion's share of the property. What is
"equitable" to attorney "A" is clearly inequitable to attorney "B."
Each is acting in a professionally ethical manner by shaping her
client's position to fit the applicable legal rule. In other words,
asking a child's attorney to argue ''best interests" is as nonsen-
sical as asking a plaintiffs personal injury lawyer to argue that
the defendant was negligent. As Jean Koh Peters has cogently
articulated:
[A]ny child advocate must become adept at translating her pro-
posals to the court into the language of 'best interests.' Just as a
tort attorney must translate a client's story into the legal lan-
guage of fault and negligence, children's attorneys must often
translate their clients' desires and goals into the framework of
'best interests.' Like any attorney who respects the client's right
to make her own informed decision, the attorney may be in the
odd position of advocating a result which, personally, the lawyer
believes is not in the child's best interests. Thus, a lawyer should
be prepared to make an argument that a client's desire is in her
best interests as long as the lawyer can do so in good faith. The
lawyer should press herself to make those arguments even when
they conflict with her personal assessment of the client's 'best
interests.'55
The critical issue boils down to the attorney's formulation
of his "best interests" position (since that is the substantive
rule). The facile, albeit generally acceptable, approach is for the
child's attorney (i.e. law guardian) to subjectively determine her
client's best interests, particularly when encouraged to do so by
the trial judge. A lawyer's determination of "best interests"
usurps the Court's function (which is precisely what some
judges want), violates the applicable statutes, and conflicts with
the promulgated rules of professional responsibility. As an al-
55. Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Context of Best Interests in Client-Di-
rected Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1505, 1515 (1996).
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ternative approach to "best interests," the attorney may simply
run with the child's conclusory wishes, "I want to live with my
mother," and parrot that to the Court. That is tantamount to
the criminal defense attorney telling the court the defendant
wishes to be exonerated, without doing anything to possibly
achieve that result.
Neither polarized approach satisfies the complex attorney-
client relationship.56 The preferred role may best be described
as a collaborative attorney-client endeavor, a relationship
which has been advanced by several prominent authors.57 An
analysis would be beyond the scope of this article, although a
few comments may be appropriate.
First, the attorney's analysis, advice and conclusions re-
garding the case are essential, but in most cases should be ar-
ticulated to the client within the attorney-client privilege.
Attorneys offer advice and, in fact, customarily influence their
client's position. For example, counsel for the alcoholic mother
will attempt to persuade her client to compromise: "The court is
very unlikely to grant you custody; we should accordingly seek
extensive visitation coupled with your agreement to enroll in a
treatment program. Ifwe go to hearing, I'm afraid you will end
up with only limited supervised visitation." The child's attorney
should similarly say to her client: "I understand why you want
to live with your mother, but the judge is unlikely to agree; why
don't we ask for extensive visitation and try to get your mother
the help she needs, with an understanding of custody considera-
tion as soon as she is better." Most children will agree to a real-
istic approach, one that meets their desires to the extent
counsel deems feasible. In fact, in my experience most children
as young as five comprehend the practicalities, provided counsel
is patient and understanding (which is not to say that every
child of five will react in a similar manner).
Second, in the majority of custody cases, or in at least those
cases which are seriously contested, both parents are fit and
56. A greater absurdity occurs when counsel speaks out of both sides of his
mouth, advocating simultaneously the child's wishes and counsel's view of "best
interests."
57. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & ROBERT BURT, IN THE INTERESTS OF CHILDREN;
ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM AND PuBLIC POLICY (1985); see also Sarah Ramsey, Repre-
sentation of the Child in Protection Proceedings: The Determination of the Decision
- Making Capacity, 17 FAM. L.Q. 287 (1983).
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able to raise their child. The law guardian may believe that
parent "A" should have custody rather than parent "B," but that
subjective conclusion should not be imposed upon the child.
The lawyer may even believe that parent "B" has unduly influ-
enced the child. That should be the subject of intensive attor-
ney-client discussions, but in the final analysis the child has the
right to have her attorney advocate custody with parent "B."
Last, the attorney's role goes beyond just taking a position
in court. Protecting the child client, reassuring the youngster,
explaining the process, or shielding the child from needless in-
terviews or forensics, may be of greater importance.58 I recently
represented two teenagers whose father petitioned for modifica-
tion of custody. The children were happy with the existing ar-
rangement, were doing well, and the custodial mother was
exemplary. The children were petrified at the thought of a pos-
sible modification and consequential relocation. At the conclu-
sion of my initial interview, I assured them that they were
going nowhere, and had every right to feel secure. I would pre-
sent their position and their fears to the court, attempt to se-
cure a dismissal of the petition, and if the case nevertheless
went to trial, would arrange for a judicial "in camera" interview
on the record. That advice was, by far, the most important law
guardian function in that particular case (in the event, on my
motion the father's petition was indeed dismissed prior to
hearing).
B. Limitations on the Traditional Attorney-Client Model,
Real and Illusory
Several reservations have been raised in academic and in
judicial circles to the realization of children's representation
predicated on the traditional attorney-client model. First, it
has been argued that the courts are not bound by children's po-
sitions, although they are required to consider "wishes" as one
component of the complex "best interests" formula. Professor
Guggenheim devotes a major part of his article to a discussion
of that ostensible constraint.59 Of course the child does not de-
58. See, e.g., Berlin v. Berlin, 820 N.Y.S.2d 602 (App. Div. 2006) (affirming a
protective order prohibiting successive intrusive forensic examination of the chil-
dren, pursuant to a motion made by the law guardian).
59. See Guggenheim, Critique, supra note 1, at 802-08.
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termine her own custody-that is why we have judges. Mter
all, judges are not obliged to follow any party's dictates in any
case in any area of law. Nevertheless, no one argues that the
attorney is thereby precluded from asserting the client's posi-
tion. As happens in every custody case, Mom desires custody
and Dad desires custody - but no one suggests that their respec-
tive counsel should desist from arguing each client's position be-
cause the judge is not bound, and will in fact decide the case by
applying neutral substantive rules. Just why the child's attor-
ney should be different escapes me.
A second ostensible constraint is that children frequently
do not want to choose between parents. That is true, and
should alter the child's lawyer's position, but constitutes no rea-
son to dispense with counsel altogether. The New York State
Bar Association standards commentaries offer the following
suggestion:
Further, the custody litigation need not be presented as an all or
nothing choice. . . . The child is entitled to the continuation of a
meaningful relationship with each parent. Liberal or extended
visitation, joint decision making or legal custody, vacations, possi-
bility of modification as the child matures, and, in some cases, an
agreement for joint physical custody merit discussion whenever
appropriate.60
In other words, the child's attorney is not required to argue
in favor of custody to parent "A," or as an alternative, custody to
parent "B." In every case the child possesses a myriad of inter-
ests in addition to the raw custodial issue: visitation, communi-
cation with each parent, financial support, and an appropriate
education are but some examples. Counsel needs to address
each with his client and with the court. Further, the attorneys
need to explain the options and permutations of custody to his
young client, to shield the child from the onslaughts of parents
who frequently pressure their offspring to "elect" them, and to
protect the child from intrusive interviews and forensics, may
be even greater when the child sees herself caught between two
conflicting adults.
60. N.Y. STATE BAR Assoc., 2 LAW GUARDIAN REPRESENTATION STANDARDS:
CUSTODY CASES 24 (3d ed. 2005).
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The third articulated limitation to the traditional attorney-
client role is the understandable attorney reluctance to advo-
cate that the child live with a dangerously unfit parent, a drug
addict or physical abuser for example. That occasionally occurs,
but should not be exaggerated. The scenario is simply non-exis-
tent in the large majority of contested custody cases. Most par-
ents who seek custody are not of that ilk and if they are, their
bid will almost never prevail, regardless of the child's position.61
In those few situations, the child's attorney should reason with
the child, and may well convince the child to forgo an untenable
position, or to compromise by accepting visitation coupled with
help for the unfit parent. In extreme cases the lawyer is also
bound by Rules of Professional Responsibility to refrain from
advocating a frivolous position. The issue is of far greater sig-
nificance to attorneys representing children in child protective
cases, where the parent is charged with malfeasance, but that is
beyond this article's scope.
Last is the inherent limitation when representing the
preverbal child. One cannot apply the attorney-client model
when the lawyer represents a six-month-old baby. When repre-
senting a child under the age of five or, in some cases, below the
age of seven or eight, the attorney is placed in a difficult posi-
tion. Should she assume the role of guardian ad litem, deter-
mining the child's "best interests" independently, and argue
accordingly? Should the attorney remain silent, or should he
assume a "neutral" position, introducing relevant evidence
which the court may weigh, without advocating a specific
outcome?
In his publications, Professor Guggenheim suggests a neu-
tral position.62 The problem with that approach is that the
young child would be effectively unrepresented, and at least in
the absence of a guardian ad litem, would have no representa-
tive to argue for his interests. For example, the "neutral" attor-
ney might feel compelled to desist from arguing in favor of
meaningful visitation, regardless of which parent prevails in ob-
61. The odds of encountering this phenomenon are admittedly greater when a
non-parent seeks custody from an unfit parent.
62. See Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role ofCounsel
for Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1416 (1996) [hereinafter Guggenheim,
ParadigmJ.
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taining custody. It may be that the attorney representing the
very young should remain "neutral" regarding physical custody,
as she would if the older child did not want to take a position,
but counsel should almost never remain neutral regarding ade-
quate visitation, parental decision making on behalf of the
child, satisfying the child's financial needs through child sup-
port, or addressing the child's psychological needs through pro-
fessional counseling.
As an alternative, the attorney may assume the role of
guardian ad litem. In the best of all possible worlds, the court
would appoint a separate guardian ad litem for the very young,
as suggested by Judge Breitel in Braiman, but that is not the
legal world we live in. Alternatively, the American Bar Associa-
tion standards suggest that the court appoint a "best interests
attorney" in the limited number of cases involving the very
young child (or the older incapacitated child), defined as "[a]
lawyer who provides independent legal services for the purpose
of protecting a child's best interests, without being bound by the
child's directions or objectives."63 However, the ABA simultane-
ously admonishes the attorney to base her "best interests" posi-
tion "on objective criteria concerning the child's needs and
interests, and not merely on the lawyer's personal values, phi-
losophies, and experiences."64 That is easier said than done, but
may constitute the "least worse" solution to representing the
preverbal child.
It should be emphasized that dispensing with the tradi-
tional attorney-client role should be reserved as a last resort.
Most children in most custody cases should be represented by a
"real" lawyer acting in just that capacity. For example, the
Model Rules of Professional conduct stipulate that, "[w]hen a
clients' capacity to make adequately considered decisions in
connection with a representation is diminished . . . because of
minority ... the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible,
maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the child."65
Children do not mature suddenly and pass the magic divide into
63. A.B.A., STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN
IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 6 (1996), available at http://www.abanet.org/family/
reports/standards_abuseneglect.pdf.
64. [d.
65. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) (1983).
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legal capacity on a date certain. Children as young as five may
be competent regarding some issues, as implied by the Model
Rules, even if unable to guide their attorney concerning the cen-
tral issue of physical custody. As noted, the legal interests of
the child extend beyond the seemingly all or nothing custody
question.
Professor Guggenheim notes that most custody cases in-
volve children who are under the age offourteen.66 That is true,
if one measures only initial custody disputes, and most children
under the age of fourteen are nevertheless competent to guide
their attorney. But custody cases may also return to court, per-
haps repeatedly, for modification or enforcement purposes. In
the interim, the child has progressed on the competency contin-
uum. The conundrum inherent when representing the very
young exists in only a relatively small percentage of cases.
Lastly, I again emphasize the central fact that the New
York statutes prescribe a traditional attorney-client relation-
ship, pure and simple. Deviation should be sanctioned only as a
last resort, and only to the minimum extent possible. Ifonly the
Matrimonial Commission had articulated clearly that simple
overarching statutory principle.
v. The Matrimonial Commission Report and the
Child's Attorney
Having discussed the statutory foundation, the history, and
role of the attorney who represents a child, I am finally able to
critique the Matrimonial Commission Report, and do so in an
appropriate context.
The Commission's evaluation commences with the bizarre
statement: "Mter an extensive review and much deliberation,
the Commission has concluded that, the attorney for the child is
not a fiduciary and should not be so regarded."67 Of course. At
least to my knowledge, no one has seriously advocated other-
wise. Nor can the child's attorney possibly fit the legal defini-
tion of a "fiduciary," in other words "[a] person or institution
who manages money or property for another and who must ex-
ercise a standard of care in such management activity, imposed
66. See Guggenheim, Critique, supra note 1, at 822 n.157.
67. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 39.
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by law or contract; e.g. executor of estate; receiver in bank-
ruptcy; trustee."68 Just why the Commission needed "extensive
review and much deliberation" is mysterious.69 Of greater sig-
nificance, the statement is misleading and confusing to the bar
and, surely, to the public at large.7o
The Commission Report continues by endorsing the state-
wide Law Guardian Advisory Committee's definition of the role
of attorney for the child. Professor Guggenheim has appropri-
ately criticized the Advisory Committee's definition, which con-
fusingly combines elements of a traditional attorney-client
relationship with a guardian ad litem or "best interests"
model.71 I see no reason to reiterate Guggenheim's critique. At
least to that point, the Commission Report has sowed confusion,
instead of the much needed clarity.
The Matrimonial Commission additionally endorses the
New York State Bar Association Standards on Representing
Children in Custody cases,72 recommending that they be
adopted by administrative rule, and thereby attain statewide
recognition and greater authority.73 The State Bar standards
essentially advocate an attorney-client role for the child's attor-
ney (unlike the statewide Law Guardian Advisory Committee).
Assiduously avoiding the term "best interests," the standards
speak of the child's desires, the child's interests, and, signifi-
cantly, the development of a case position together with the
child.74 Unlike the American Bar Association, the New York
Bar Association has not quite concluded that the attorney for
the child should ordinarily function in an unalloyed attorney-
client role, but the State Association comes close, a fact noted by
68. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). The definition is obviously alien
to an attorney providing legal representation.
69. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 39.
70. The relevant footnote states that the regulatory process of a private-paid
attorney for the child is included in Part 36 of the Rules of the Chief Judge, id. at
39 n.39, which happens to incorporate rules for fiduciaries. That the rules are
incorporated in the fiduciary section is unfortunate, and probably only a matter of
convenience.
71. See Guggenheim, Critique, supra note 1, at 789.
72. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 42.
73. I may be wrong, but I just do not believe judicial administration can enact
a rule telling a lawyer what to do when representing a client. What then, is to be
gained by converting the bar standards into a rule?
74. LAw GUARDIAN REPRESENTATION STANDARDS, supra note 60, at 24.
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Professor Guggenheim.75 However, he continues by criticizing
one paragraph of the commentaries to the standards which
posits that the law guardian is "the only neutral participant
other than the judge, and the person legally bound to represent
the child's interests . . . . Great weight may therefore be given
to the law guardian's position."76 In my opinion, the State Bar
statement, which, after all, is a commentary and is not an oper-
ative standard, is intended only as a truism. A law guardian
indeed represents a more "neutral" participant than the embat-
tled parents, and for that reason, along with the fact that judges
understandably tend to look to the child's attorney for a less
passionate position, the law guardian's position tends to be,
well, "weighty."
An isolated commentary paragraph does not detract from
the Standard's thrust. If the Matrimonial Commission had en-
dorsed the State Bar position without embracing the contradic-
tory Law Guardian Advisory Committee position, and had
avoided adding the confusing "fiduciary" language, it would
have at least contributed to a more traditional model (and one
based squarely on the statutory mandates). Even better, the
Commission could have endorsed the traditional model out-
right, thereby ameliorating, if not undoing, decades of conflict
and doubletalk.
Surprisingly, the Commission does not discuss, or even cite,
the national models for child representation, such as the 1996
Fordham Law School Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal
Representation of Children.77 Cutting through the then and
now jumble of ''best interests," "guardian," and "child's wishes"
statutes and case law,78 the Fordham Conference reached a
strong consensus, recommending a lawyering position which
prohibits the child's attorney from ever acting as a guardian ad
litem:
The lawyer should assume the obligations of a lawyer, regardless
of how the lawyer's rule is labeled, be it as guardian ad litem,
attorney ad litem, law guardian or other. The lawyer should not
75. I confess a relationship with the standards; I was one of the drafters and
was the Chair of the Committee at the time of their adoption.
76. See Guggenheim, Critique, supra note 1 at 824-25.
77. Do they believe that New York is totally unique?
78. See also STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 6.
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serve as the child's guardian ad litem or in another role insofar as
the role including responsibilities inconsistent with those of a
lawyer for the child.79
The Fordham position was subsequently expanded by
American Bar Association standards, initially for child protec-
tive cases,80 and, subsequently, for the representation of chil-
dren in child custody cases.S! In its commentary, the ABA
standards carefully distinguish (as do the New York statutes)
the child's legal interests from his "best interests:"
'Legal interests' are distinct from "best interests" and from the
child's objectives. "Legal interests" are interests of the child that
are specifically recognized in law and that can be protected
through the courts. A child's legal interests could include, for ex-
ample, depending on the nature of the case, a special needs child's
right to appropriate educational, medical, or mental health ser-
vices ... a child's support, governmental and other financial bene-
fits; visitation with siblings, family members, or others the child
wishes to maintain contact with; and a child's due process or other
procedural rights.s2
A similar conclusion has been reached by the American As-
sociation of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML).83 And recently a
Conference on the Representation of Children, hosted by the
University of Nevada School of Law, concluded that: "A lawyer
appointed or retained to represent a child in a legal proceeding
79. Proceedings on the Conference on Ethicallssues in the Legal Representa-
tion of Children, Recommendations of the Conference, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301
(1996). A traditional approach had been advocated by several earlier commenta-
tors. See Sarah Ramsey, Representation ofChildren in Protection Proceedings: The
Determination ofDecision-Making Capacity, 17 FAM. L.Q. 287 (1983); Martin Gug-
genheim, The Right to be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on Representing
Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76 (1984).
80. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 63.
81. A.B.A. SECTION OF FAMILY LAw, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS
REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CUSTODY CASES (2003), available at http://www.
abanet.org/family/reports/standards_childcustody.pdf.
82. ld. at 12.
83. AMER. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN: STAN-
DARDS FOR ATTONEYS AND GUARDIANS An LITEM IN CUSTODY OR VISITATION PRO-
CEEDINGS (1995). The AAML position is that the older child should be represented
by an attorney who assures a traditional attorney-client relationship, while the
young or preschool child should not be represented at all.
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should serve as the child's lawyer, regardless of how the law-
yer's role is labeled or the age of the child."84
Every nationally promulgated set of standards for repre-
senting children has accordingly endorsed the same basic thesis
(although, as Professor Guggenheim notes, the approaches vary
when applied to the very young or otherwise incapacitated
child). So too, the New York statutes compel a traditional attor-
ney-client relationship, as outlined at the commencement of
this article, and the statutes predate the impressive national
symposiums. The Matrimonial Commission could have urged a
return to New York's statutory standards, as bolstered by the
prevailing national principles, citing the position of the organ-
ized bar and the academic community.85 Or the Commission
could have suggested an entirely different approach, such as
"best interests" advocacy, and recommended the necessary stat-
utory amendments to achieve that result (though both Professor
Guggenheim and I would object vehemently). It did neither,
falling back on a confusingly modest encouragement of the at-
torney-client model, and a plea for additional study of an issue
which has already been studied to death.
Turning their attention next to prevalent trial court trans-
gressions, the Matrimonial Commission concludes: "A recur-
ring problem cited in the response to the Commission's surveys
84. Barbara Kaban et aI., Report of the Working Group on the Best Interests of
the Child and the Role of the Attorney, 6 NEV. L.J. 682,683 (2006). Professor Gug-
genheim cogently summarizes the ABA and AAML standards; there is no need to
duplicate his outline (Guggenheim, Critique, supra note 1 at 795.). Although the
ABA standards include the possibility of appointing a "best interests" attorney
when the child is very young or otherwise seriously impaired, the premise is that
most attorneys will adhere to a straight attorney-client relationship, with the child
directing the litigation's objectives:
The child's attorney should abide by the client's decisions about the objec-
tives of the representation with respect to each issue on which the child is
competent to direct the lawyer, and does so. The child's attorney should
pursue the child's expressed objectives, unless the child requests otherwise,
and follow the child's direction throughout the case.
FAMILY LAW STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 81, at II.
85. I do not mean to suggest that other states have avoided the "best inter-
ests" approach. Far from that. Like New York, many state courts have articulated
a conflicting approach. See, e.g., In re Esperanza M., 955 P.2d 204 (N.M. Ct. App.
1998) (where the New Mexico court commented that the applied state statute "sig-
nifies a guardian ad litem's dual role of representing the child's best interests,
while also presenting the child's position to the court").
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relates to the court's expectations regarding the role of the at-
torney for the child."86 Following a gentle reminder that the at-
torney must advocate for the child "as is required of any other
attorney in a civil proceeding or action,"87 the Report lists a se-
ries of prohibited albeit prevalent judicial errors. What is re-
markable is not the list itself, but rather the fact that although
each has been specifically proscribed pursuant to Appellate Di-
vision case law, each is nevertheless commonly engaged in by
the trial courts. Thus, the court shall not make "improper re-
quests for recommendations,"88 shall not delegate judicial re-
sponsibilities (does not the trial bench know that?), shall not
engage in ex parte communications,89 shall not request that the
attorney for the child select the forensic expert (that, too, is a
clear abdication of judicial responsibility), and shall never re-
quest reports prepared by the attorney for the child.90 The re-
quest of a law guardian report has also been found to violate the
canons of judicial ethics.91 Whether ex parte or shared, a pre-
trial report prepared by counsel, replete with hearsay com-
ments, subjective impressions, and recommendations regarding
custody, is patently offensive in any case.92 Yet, the practice
constitutes part of the everyday life of children's attorneys
throughout the State (ex parte verbal conversation between law
guardians and judges are also not unheard of).
Judicial disregard of the most elementary rules governing
attorney conduct poses a serious problem, one which is only ex-
acerbated when continued after multiple appellate reversals.
Something is happening, something which may be immune to
even Matrimonial Commission condemnation.
To this writer, the problem's root is the appointive powers
exercised by the trial bench. As long as the trial judge chooses
the attorney for the child in each case (directly or indirectly via
86. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 43.
87.Id.
88. See In re Devin XX, 797 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 2005).
89. See Weiglhofer v. Weiglhofer, 766 N.Y.S.2d 727 (App. Div. 2003).
90.Id.
91. See N.Y.S. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT ON THE MATTER OF JOHN G.
CONNOR (2003) (the Judicial Commission admonished a judge who had requested a
report from the law guardian).
92. A report should be distinguished from a post-trial brief, which, by defini-
tion, is limited to arguing the evidence on the record, is served on each party, and
is accompanied by adversary briefs.
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instructions to court clerks), many judges will continue to view
the attorney as an arm of the court and resist the notion of inde-
pendent counsel. Interestingly, every case cited in the above
analysis involved a panel law guardian. I do not believe a New
York City Family Court Judge would dream of requesting an ex
parte report from a law guardian employed by the Juvenile
Rights Division. Perhaps the only viable solution lies in sys-
temic reform of the appointive process, a vital need which the
Matrimonial Commission disregarded altogether.93
VI. The Matrimonial Commission and Systemic Problems
In its law guardian section, the Matrimonial Commission
does not generally comment on the systemic problems of the law
guardian (or child's attorney) system. The only exception is the
"private pay" law guardian mechanism. I'll commence with an
analysis of that issue, but continue with a discussion of addi-
tional organizational aspects which, in my opinion, merit inclu-
sion in any program to improve the representation of children:
the appointive power of judges and the oversight responsibili-
ties of the Office of Court Administration.
A. "Private Pay"
A "private pay" law guardian (or a private pay attorney for
the child) is appointed by the court, but paid by the parents (or
other contestant). The court establishes a fee, ordinarily based
on a "market rate" of several hundred dollars per hour, and
stipulates the percentage to be paid by each parent. The prac-
tice represents a stark departure from the "traditional" law
guardian who represents the child, submits a voucher at the
conclusion of the proceedings, and is paid by the state at the
statutory rate of seventy-five (75) dollars per hour.
As noted earlier in this article, the "private pay" attorney is
not a law guardian-the relevant statutes conflict with the
practice.94 In fact, the notion was unheard of until the early
1990s, thirty years after enactment of the law guardian stat-
utes. Apparently sparked by the 1990 amendment to Section 35
of the Judiciary Law, which permitted the Supreme Court to
93. See infra Part VI.
94. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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appoint a law guardian, a few Supreme Court judges devised
the scheme to replace the statutory state system.95 Not to be
outdone, several family court judges subsequently found that
they, too, could direct "private pay."96 The practice spread like
wildfire, with no control, no supervision, and no authorization.
In recent years, the Office of Court Administration has slightly
reigned in the largely anarchic practice by requiring certifica-
tion and limiting total annual compensation of the professional
"private pay" attorney. And, as might be expected, in recent
years legal challenges have been mounted in each judicial
department.
The "private pay" attorney first appears at footnote 8, page
6, of the Commission Report, when the Commission notes that
the practice's validity has been upheld by some Appellate Divi-
sions while other Appellate Divisions have vacated "private
pay" orders, concluding that the system is ultra vires.97 In fact,
the Second Department, and only the Second Department, has
fully upheld the scheme.98 In upholding the "private pay" ar-
rangement, the court relied on an attenuated reading of the rel-
evant statute, holding that, "Judiciary Law section 35 allows
the court to utilize an alternative method to compensate attor-
neys who have been assigned to represent individuals with the
financial ability to retain counsel."99 Of course, the relevant in-
dividual, a child, almost never has the financial ability to retain
counsel, so the court neatly transferred the financial test to an
irrelevant individual, the parent. The court also invoked the
ancient discredited common law "necessaries" doctrine,
whereby a father must supply his child with "necessaries" (a
lawyer?).100 The common law necessaries doctrine has long
been superseded by modern child support statutes, which go far
beyond supplying the bare "necessaries" encompassed by the
doctrine, such as basic food and clothing. The doctrine's resur-
95. One of the earliest cases is Bronstein v. Bronstein, 610 N.Y.S.2d 638 (App.
Div. 1994). "Private pay" was not thought of prior to the Section 35 amendment,
Le., when children were unrepresented, and may have actually benefited from a
"private pay" lawyer, or any other lawyer.
96. See Matter of Wolfson v. Wolfson, 644 N.Y.S.2d 746 (App. Div. 1996).
97. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 8, at 6 n. 8.
98. See Plovnick v. Klinger, 781 N.Y.S.2d 360 (App. Div. 2004).
99. Id. at 364.
100. Id. at 365.
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rection for the purpose of promoting highly priced attorneys as
"necessary" for junior's legal interests may be amusing, but rep-
resents a sad commentary on this state's commitment to chil-
dren's representation.101
The Fourth Department has held that the system may be
utilized in Supreme Court, but not in Family Court,102 while the
First Department has yet to render a definitive decision. l03 To
complete the appellate cycle, the Third Department has reached
a conclusion diametrically opposite to the Second Department's
position. Citing the relevant statutes,104 the court found the
practice to be invalid:
With respect to compensation, while the statutes and regulations
speak directly to a procedure for payment from the state, there is
no specific statutory or regulatory scheme for direct payment of
an appointed Law Guardian by a parent or parents [cite omitted].
The lack of parameters for a direct-pay system creates the poten-
tial for issues about the integrity of the appointment process in
such situations (which often pay no attention to the statutory
caps on compensation for assigned counsel), draws into question
the independence of the Law Guardian, and raises concerns about
fundamental fairness to all children regardless of the economic
status of their parents.105
The "private pay" phenomenon has indeed created a dual
system. Children of affiuent parents receive highly paid coun-
sel, while other children are represented by lower paid "state"
counsel. Independence, or at least the perception of indepen-
dence, is compromised when the judge hand picks an attorney
101. I have not been able to find a case similar to Plovnick anywhere in the
United States.
102. Lyndon A.H. v. Diane T.O., 673 N.Y.S.2d 989 (App. Div. 1998).
103. The Commission states in footnote 8 that the First Department permits
the practice, but that is very unclear. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 8, at 6 n.8. In the only case cited, Tran v. Tran, 716 N.Y.S.2d 5 (App. Div.
2000), the court notes that the trial court required the defendant to pay the law
guardian fee, but never discusses the issue in its brief opinion. The probable ex-
planation is that the Appellate Division simply recited the provisions of the order,
including those like the "private pay," that may not have been appealed from.
104. The most pertinent provision is N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 248 (McKinney
1999) (statim~ "[t]he costs oflaw guardians ... shall be payable by the State of New
York").
105. Redder v. Redder, 792 N.Y.S.2d 201, 203 (App. Div. 2005) (citing N.Y.
Fam. Ct. Act § 248).
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to be paid by the parties who are vying for custody.lo6 It gets
worse. "Private pay" representation is unfortunately a political
patronage plum. With little control over lucrative judicial as-
signments, party politics and office politics proliferate. I have
been a duly certified member of the Westchester "private pay"
panel for several years. But I have yet to be assigned a single
case. Perhaps I lack the ability to represent "important" chil-
dren, despite decades of law guardian representation; but I fear
the reason lies elsewhere. In several counties (such as my home
county of Westchester) a few attorneys maintain a political
"lock" on the plum, a fact which has been publicized and should
have been known to the Commission.l°7 For example, in 2001
the New York Post reported that the "private pay" law guardian
assigned to represent the children of financial mogul Ron Perel-
man "raked in an estimated 1.5 million since the litigation be-
gan five years ago," and quoted a "court insider's remark, '[i]t's
all patronage ... she makes more money than any judge."'lo8
Of greater significance, the recent scandals in the Kings
County Supreme Court centered, in part, on lavishing private
law guardian fees on an attorney who, in turn, plied gifts and
other favors on the judge. Thus, in 2003 Newsday reported
that, "Supreme Court Judge Gerald Garson [subsequently in-
dicted and convicted] assigned 18 law guardianships to attorney
Paul Siminovsky [the lawyer in question], half of all such as-
signments ... ," and that Siminovsky was the Judge's "favorite
attorney."109 Newsday subsequently reported that the District
Attorney "alleged Siminovsky received [law guardian] assign-
ments from Garson in exchange for ... gifts, as well as cash"llo
106. The atmosphere may become even uglier if the parent who has been or-
dered to pay refuses, precipitating a contempt action in the midst of a custody
dispute. See Siskind v. Schael, 823 N.Y.S.2d 436 (App. Div. 2006).
107. In 1998, the New York State Bar Association recommended systemic re-
form, including the publication and dissemination "of privately paid law guardians
by name, county, judge, date and amount of fee awarded." N.Y.S. BAR AsS'N., RE-
PORT TO THE TASK FORCE ON LAW GUARDlANS, THE PRIVATELY PAlD LAW GUARDlAN,
FINAL REPORT 12 (1998). That bit of recommended sunshine has never been
implemented.
108. Gaurdian's Gravy Train Ends, N.Y. POST, Oct. 14, 2001 at 12, col. 2.
109. Graham Rayman, The Judge's 'Favorite'; Attorney Assigned 18 Gaurdi-
anships, NEWSDAY (Long Island, New York), Queens Ed., June 4, 2003, at A6.
110. Anthony DeStefano, Hynes: Garrison Just the Start, Newsday (Long Is-
land, New York), Queens Edition, Aug. 7,2003, at A17.
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and that Justice Garson accepted dinners and gifts after "re-
warding lawyer Paul Siminovsky with law guardian assign-
ments."lll Siminovsky subsequently admitted "he committed
crimes with Garson ... and Garson gave him law guardianships
in return."112 Lastly, in reversing an Appellate Division order
dismissing some of the charges against Garson, the Court of Ap-
peals cited the indictment charging that "from January 1, 2002
through March 12, 2003, defendant [Garson] accepted lunches,
beverages and cigars from Siminovsky in exchange for as-
signing law guardianships, and giving ex parte advice to Simi-
novsky concerning cases that were pending before
defendant."113 Is that the representation we want for our
children?
Against that backdrop, it is astonishing that the Matrimo-
nial Commission unhesitatingly endorses the practice, recom-
mending legislation to authorize courts throughout the state to
appoint "private pay" counsel for children in custody cases.114
The only justification the Commission offers is economic-a
statute would "place the responsibility for the cost of these [chil-
dren's attorney] services upon those who can afford them, [and]
reduce the case load and cost of publicly funded programs and
assignments."115 The Commission Report does not include one
word regarding political favoritism, fairness, bribery or inde-
pendence, and not a word on the need to at least control the
excesses. If economics is the issue (and I agree that affluent
parents should not benefit from the public purse), the solution
might be a statute requiring wealthy parents to reimburse the
state for the state-paid child's attorney. The independence and
integrity of the system would thereby be preserved, without ex-
panding a misconceived, legally questionable, and scandal-
prone practice.
111. Anthony DeStefano, Free Review of Garison Rulings, NEWSDAY (Long Is-
land, New York), Queens Edition, Aug. 7, 2003, at A07.
112. Anthony DeStefano, Brooklyn Court Officials' Trial; Lawyer Details
Court 'Crimes,' NEWSDAY, City Edition, Sept. 2,2004, at A15.
113. People v. Garson, 848 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 2006).
114. See MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 44. The validity
of the practice is of course unsettled, and ripe for Court of Appeals resolution. Un-
til such time, or until the legislature acts, each department may go its own way.
115. [d.
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B. The Appointive Process
A paramount American jurisprudential rule is attorney in-
dependence. Lawyers, whether retained or appointed, are sup-
posed to be autonomous, freed from any dependence upon the
judge or the judicial system as a whole. Thus, the ABA Stan-
dards for Lawyers Representing Children in Custody Cases, ad-
monishes that, "[tlhe Court must assure that the lawyer is
independent of the court, court services, the parties [i.e., the
parents], and the state."1l6
An essential element in assuring independence is the sepa-
ration of the judge and the court from the appointive process.
Where representation has been institutionalized, as when a le-
gal aid society or similar organization provides representation,
the attorney is automatically endowed with considerable inde-
pendence. The individual who enters the courtroom, with or for
her assigned client, has not been chosen by the court. The at-
torney's future assignments are not at stake, and, of equal sig-
nificance, the client does not perceive that counsel's
independence has been compromised. However, where repre-
sentation is afforded through a panel system, other mechanisms
are needed to separate the individual attorney from the court.
For that reason, the New York State Bar Association Standards
for Providing Mandated Representation, which, inter alia, en-
compasses law guardians, stipulates:
Where mandated representation is to be provided by assigned
counsel, the selection of the individual attorney to be assigned
shall not be made by a judge or court official except in an emer-
gency or in exceptional circumstances. The selection of the indi-
vidual attorney to be assigned shall be made by someone outside
the court system in order to ensure the independence of
counsel.I17
The system of providing representation to adults in crimi-
nal and civil proceedings complies fully with the organizational
standards cited above. Assigned counsel plan administrators
maintain the panels and assign individual counsel, usually on a
rotational basis. The judge has no input.
116. STANDARD OF PRACTICE FOR CUSTODY CASES, supra note 83, at 20.
117. N.Y. STATE BAR AsS'N, STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING MANDATED REPRESEN-
TATION, Standard A-3 (2005).
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Unfortunately, the important principle has not been ap-
plied to children. On the contrary, the standards and rules gov-
erning attorney independence have been systematically
violated. Except in those courts served by institutional repre-
sentation, such as JRD in New York City, the judge chooses the
attorney, either directly or through his court clerk or court at-
torney.I18 The attorney is consequently utterly dependent on
the court, for that case as well as for future appointments. An-
ecdotal evidence is rife with reports of attorneys removed from
the certified law guardian list on a "de facto" basis-the rele-
vant judge simply ceases to choose that lawyer, ever. Over the
years several attorneys have advised me that they were rele-
gated to the "unused" portion of the certified list. On several
occasions an attorney has also advised that his representation
has been severely compromised by his utter dependence on the
bench; for example, he could not file a motion which might bene-
fit the child client because the judge would be alienated. In ef-
fect, certification to be a member of a law guardian panel is
tantamount to receiving a fishing license; you qualify, but may
not necessarily catch any fish. Your success is dependent upon
judicial discretion and favor.
In light of the current appointive mechanism, the list ofju-
dicial "evils" outlined by the Matrimonial Commission should
come as no surprise.119 The keeper of the appointive keys may
perceive the child's attorney as an arm of the court, a personal
appointee who may be invited to engage in ex parte communica-
tions, select forensic evaluations, or draft hearsay- riddled sub-
jective reports to guide the court. Perhaps the surprise is that
the majority of judges nevertheless adhere to ethical and case
law constraints.
The problem is exacerbated in cases involving the "private
pay" attorney, and "private pay" is limited almost exclusively to
custody cases. The lucrative financial rewards, coupled with an
exclusive "club" atmosphere, cut against even mild indepen-
dence and foster rank favoritism if not corruption. Assuming
continuation of the practice, the least that might have been rec-
118. There is some variation; for example in some New York City Family
Courts a law guardian is assigned "intake" and is thereby automatically assigned
cases which are filed that day.
119. See MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 40-44.
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ommended is the removal of the appointive power from the
judges' hands. For similar reasons, the present system discour-
ages exercise of the child's statutory right to choose counsel;
substitution of the judge's personal choice of counsel is more dif-
ficult to achieve than the substitution of an attorney randomly
selected by a non-court administrator,12o
One perfectly feasible solution to this vexing problem, ne-
glected by the Matrimonial Commission, is to move the appoin-
tive process to a higher level, one removed from the day-to-day
trial court milieu. As noted earlier, each department maintains
a law guardian director's office within the Appellate Division.
The directors have successfully implemented training pro-
grams, continuing education seminars, directories of non-legal
experts (such as investigators, psychologists and social work-
ers), and each is active in the process of certifying and re-certi-
fYing panel attorneys. Each is fully familiar with the trial
courts within the department. A rather simple measure,
achievable through court rule, would be to vest the Law Guard-
ian Director with the authority to appoint the child's attorney in
each case, with rotational selection mandated. The problems
inherent in judicial assignment would be greatly ameliorated.
The perception and the reality of independence would be re-
stored, and the subjective powers of the trial courts (Family and
Supreme) replaced by a far more objective administration. An
alternative method would be the establishment of a law guard-
ian plan administrator, on a departmental or at the state level,
paralleling the adult assigned panel administrators. The propo-
sal is not utopian. All I am suggesting is that the system uti-
lized for adults be employed for children. l21 Just why needed
fundamental reform of the assignment system escaped the Mat-
rimonial Commission is mystifying; it clearly should have
120. See Guggenheim, Critique, supra note 1, at 808. Professor Guggenheim's
experience parallels mine; on one occasion, for example, the court denied my mo-
tion to represent teenage children, whose reasonable position had been rejected by
the assigned law guardian, on the ground that I would not be a "neutral"
participant.
121. I realize that the law guardian directors are nevertheless part of the
court system, although removed from the trial courts. Hence the system would not
conform strictly to the NYSBA standards. I also realize that the adult representa-
tion system is far from perfect, and in many respects law guardian representation
is superior. All I am suggesting is that in this respect the adult assigned counsel
system merits replication.
HeinOnline -- 27 Pace L. Rev. 862 2006-2007
2007] RESPONSE TO GUGGENHEIM 863
formed part of any prescription to afford children meaningful
representation.
C. Oversight Responsibilities
The final component of New York's children's representa-
tion structure which merits discussion is the oversight responsi-
bility of the Office of Court Administration or, more accurately,
OCA's Board of Directors, the Administrative Board.122 Statu-
torily, the law guardian system is envisioned as one integrated
statewide organization.123 To accomplish the goal of a unified
system, while maintaining a regional presence throughout the
state's four departments, specific authority is granted to OCA,
while other functions may be delegated to the Appellate Divi-
sions. However, Appellate Division authority is subject to ad-
ministrative board standards and oversight. Hence, the
Appellate Division law guardian panels and contracts are "sub-
ject to the approval of the administrative board of the courtS."124
The overarching provision is Section 246 of the Family Court
Act:
The administrative board of the judicial conference [now OCA]
may prescribe standards for the exercise of the powers granted to
the appellate divisions under this part and may require such re-
ports as it deems necessary.125
The section has never been implemented. There exist no
statewide standards, and as far as I know, the Administrative
Board has never exercised its right to require reports. Instead,
each Appellate Division has gone its own way, exercising near
plenary power in designating panels and entering agreements
with attorneys, although, OCA has on occasion entered into
agreements with legal aid societies to replace Appellate Divi-
sion directed representation. More critically, the determination
of the type of representation to be provided in each county, and
in each court (Family and Supreme), has been made on an ad
122. The Administrative Board of the Courts includes the Chief Judge of the
Court of Appeals, as chair, and the four Appellate Division presiding judges. See
N.Y. CONST. art. 6, §28.
123. See supra Part I.
124. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 243(b) (McKinney 1999).
125. [d. § 246.
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hoc basis, with no apparent statewide process and in the ab-
sence of articulated standards.
Section 243 of the Family Court Act provides three distinct
methods to provide representation: a) an OCA agreement with
a legal aid society, b) an Appellate Division agreement with
"qualified attorneys," and c) a panel system.126 Who determines
which of the three very different arrangements will be imple-
mented in each of the state's sixty-two counties? The answer is
obvious if one reads the statutes: The Administrative Board, as
implemented by OCA. However, in forty-five years OCA has
never published or otherwise expressed standards to determine
that significant issue, and has published no reports to guide the
bar and the public. For forty-five years Suffolk County law
guardian services have been provided by full time law guardi-
ans under an OCA contract. However, in neighboring Nassau
County, demographically almost identical to Suffolk, the panel
system has been used exclusively. There may be a reason for
the dichotomy (other than historical accident), but, if so, the
reason has never been published or otherwise explained. To
cite one additional example, several different organizations pro-
vide law guardian services in New York City, together with
panel representation (and "super panel" representation pro-
vided by "private pay" attorneys). That, too, appears to be
largely ad hoc, with organizations added as law guardian as-
signments expanded into heretofore unserved areas, such as
foster care and child custody. What is missing is a coherent
plan with appropriate analysis and justifications.
These examples could be multiplied across the state. There
is nothing inherently wrong when different modes of represen-
tation are employed, or different organizations provide services
within one geographic area. In fact, one could argue that multi-
plicity is healthy. But that cannot justify the absence of articu-
lated reasons, or the lack of promulgated standards which may
be reviewed and ultimately replicated in similar situations.
Of course, the need for statewide standards, practices, and
oversight extend beyond the determination of the mode ofrepre-
sentation. One example is individual attorney caseload limits.
Presently, a child's attorney may maintain a virtually unlimited
126. [d. § 243.
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caseload. Another example is the ability to rectify systemic de-
ficiencies through class action or special litigation. In New
York City, JRD maintains a special litigation division, financed
as part of the DCA agreement. However, that capability is
sorely missing throughout the remainder of the state. Perhaps
JRD could undertake statewide responsibility in that limited
area, or a statewide office to mount systemic challenges might
be funded separately.l27 A law guardian backup center to pro-
vide independent professional assistance would also constitute
a major improvement, one which is squarely within the Admin-
istrative Board's purview. Today a panel law guardian who
confronts an unusually complicated or novel issue has nowhere
to turn.128 Lastly, the current law guardian disciplinary system
is totally ad hoc; the applicable procedures vary, and a child, a
parent, or any other interested party cannot possibly know
where to file a complaint or how a complaint will be determined.
Statewide substantive and administrative rules, promulgated
by DCA, and perhaps administered by the appellate divisions,
could satisfy that unmet need.
The above examples are only illustrative. The essential
fact is that in forty-five years the statutorily intended statewide
authority remains unfulfilled. The Matrimonial Commission
could have achieved much good by addressing the issue and rec-
ommending that, at long last, the OCA exercise its authority to
establish standards and to supervise the unified New York
State system of providing children's representation.
Conclusion
Professor Guggenheim entitled his article "A Law Guardian
by Any Other Name," reflecting the Matrimonial Commission's
recommendation that the appellation "law guardian" be
127. A few examples of poss(ble litigation which is beyond the capabilities of
individually paid attorneys or small county organizations include (a) the practice
of detaining children far from their homes in violation of their right to assist in
their defense (there exists only five secure detention facilities outside New York
City); or (b) extended delays in implementing the placement of children.
128. A law guardian backup office (modeled in the still active criminal defense
backup center) was briefly funded by the state legislature in the 1980s, but was
abolished when the annual appropriation was not renewed despite its success and
popularity within the law guardian community.
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changed to "child's attorney."129 The recommendation should be
implemented, terminating decades of needless confusion.130
Several additional Commission proposals are meritorious, in-
cluding the adoption of statewide standards of representation
and the abolition of clearly invalid practices, such as ex parte
communications between children's attorneys and the courts.
The Commission recommendations are nevertheless largely
cosmetic. Unfortunately, the sole substantive recommendation
is the legitimization of the "private pay" system-the Commis-
sion would have been well advised to propose the opposite. Of
greater significance, the Matrimonial Commission essentially
punted regarding the essential question of the child attorney's
role and responsibilities, endorsing conflicting standards, ad-
ding a new dose of confusion by raising the "fiduciary" issue,
and advocating further unnecessary study. Moreover, the Com-
mission's overly brief law guardian section omits entirely any
mention of systemic problems, including the problematic ap-
pointive procedures and the long neglected, albeit necessary,
adoption of statewide standards to guide the selection and con-
duct of attorneys who provide representation to society's most
vulnerable citizens.
To return to my opening theme, all one has to do is read the
original statutes which established, and still govern, law guard-
ians (or, if renamed, children's attorneys). The message is
clear, provided the reader disregards the decades of practice
and case law aberrations. An attorney for a child is simply an
attorney, one whose responsibilities are to protect the client's
interests and attempt to achieve the client's goals, as refined
through consultation and realistic legal assessments. The over-
all statutory structure, a sophisticated allocation between state-
wide responsibilities (to be enforced by OCA) and significant
authority delegated to the appellate divisions, remains a viable
blueprint-but has never been implemented in a meaningful
manner. There is no need for additional study, or for new sub-
stantive legislation. We need only the courage to follow the
original scripture.
129. See Guggenheim, Critique, supra note 1.
130. The proposal is not novel-for several years the New York State Bar As-
sociation has advocated the same.
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The Matrimonial Commission should be commended for
recommending and supporting several bold initiatives, includ-
ing the enactment of no-fault divorce, the encouragement of al-
ternate dispute resolution techniques such as mediation, the
substitution of "parenting time" for visitation, and the expan-
sion of parent education programs. It is indeed unfortunate
that the Commission's constructive approach stalled when it
reached the very significant subject of children's representation.
I end by reiterating my agreement with Professor Guggen-
heim's concluding remark: "The Commission missed an impor-
tant opportunity to make a lasting contribution to this
important area of practice."
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